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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-PoLICE POWER-MORTGAGE MoRATo~iu.-Appellants
presented a petition for an order extending the period of redemption under
Chapter 339, Laws of Minnesota, 1933, alleging execution of mortgage, default,
foreclosure and sale, due effort to redeem, and prayed that the time of redemption be extended. Respondent objected that Chapter 339 was unconstitutional in
that it impaired the obligation of contract, and was not warranted under the
police power of the state. Held, that while the law in question impairs the obligation of contract, the Legislature, under the police power has the authority to
enact laws to relieve a public emergency, provided that the impairment is no
more than is reasonably necessary. Blaisdell et al. v. Home Building and Loan
Ass'n., (Minn., 1933) 249 N.W. 334.

The police power includes all legislation and almost every function of civil
government. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 5 Sup. Ct. 357, 28 L. Ed. 923
(1885). "It embraces regulations designed to promote public convenience or the
general prosperity or welfare." Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 35 Sup. Ct. 501,
59 L. Ed. 835 (1915).
Whether such an emergency exists as justifies the exercise of police power is
for the Legislature to proclaim, but the power to determine whether the emergency does in fact exist rests in the courts. Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair,264 U.S.
543, 44 Sup. Ct. 405, 68 L. Ed. 841 (1924). An emergency cannot become the
source of power, but "it may afford a reason for putting forth a latent governmental power already enjoyed but not previously exercised." People of New
York ex. rel. Durham Realty Co. v. La Fetra, 230 N.Y. 429, 130 N.E. 601, 16
A.L.R. 152 (1921). Such latent power may be that, which the state has, to establish regulations reasonably necessary to secure the general welfare of the community by the exercise of its police power, although the rights of private property are thereby curtailed and the freedom of contract abrogated. Chicago, B.
and Q. R. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 561, 26 Sup. Ct. 341, 50 L. Ed. 596, 4 Ann.
Cas. 1175 (1906). That an emergency exists such as calls for action may be
common knowledge. People ex rel. Realty Co. v. La Fetra,supra. And it may be
so evident, that the court will take judicial notice of the fact, so that the court
cannot hold that the Legislature had no basis in fact for the conclusion that an
economic emergency existed which called for the exercise of the police power to
grant relief. Blaisdell et al. v. Honre Building and Loan Ass'n., supra.
In view of the fact that the Legislature, in adopting the statute in question,
had prefixed the customary "whereas" emergency clauses, and since it was common knowledge that an emergency did exist, the court was satisfied that the
instant case would fall under the principles laid down in the "Rent Cases."
People v. La Fetra, supra; Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 230 N.Y. 634,
130 N.E. 923 (1921), aff. in 258 U.S. 242, 42 Sup. Ct. 289, 66 L. Ed. 595 (1921) ;
Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct 458, 65 L. Ed. 865, 16 A.L.R. 165
(1921) ; Marcus Brown Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170, 41 Sup. Ct. 465, 65 L. Ed.
877 (1921); Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, supra.
Also, the court referring to the "Rent Cases," supra, said that in an emergency the Legislature could withdraw a summary remedy given by statute for
the enforcement of contract rights, provided that some adequate remedy was
left remaining. P. 336, 340.
A somewhat similar state of facts presented itself before the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in an early case. Von Baumbach v. Bade, 9 Wis. 559 (1859).
A statute had been passed creating a six-month period during which a mortgagor might answer in a foreclosure action, instead of the previous twenty day
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period; it also provided for a six-month notice of sale instead of the previous
six-week notice. It was held that the law was merely procedural in nature,

not taking from the mortgagee his remedy, but merely altering the remedy of
enforcement. The Legislature has the power to repeal, amend, change or modify
the proceedings in court, both as to past and future contracts, as long as the
parties are left with a substantial remedy. Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311 (1843)
Tennessee v. Snead, 96 U.S. 69, 24 L. Ed. 610 (1877).
FRANK J. ANTOINE.

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-POLICE POWER-PR cE FIxING.-A law passed by the

New York state legislature (Laws of 1933, c. 158) declared that the milk industry was one of paramount importance to the people of the state; that a present
emergency existed in the industry; and founded a control board with the power
to license dealers and fix minimum prices. The statute also provided a criminal
sanction for violation. A dealer sold milk for a price lower than that fixed by
the control board and was criminally prosecuted for the violation. The defense
brought the constitutionality of the law into question. Held, the law is constitutional. People of New York v. Nebbia, 262 N.Y. 259, 186 N.E. 694 (1933).
The police power of the state may be invoked to regulate an industry only
when the industry is of primary importance, New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,
285 U.S. 262, 52 Sup. Ct. 371, 76 L.Ed. 747 (1931), or when there is an emergency
situation. Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, et al., 256 U.S. 170, 41 Sup. Ct.
465, 65 L. Ed. 877 (1920).; Black v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458, 65
L. Ed. 865, 16 A.L.R. 165 (1920). The police power itself is concerned with
protecting the lives, health, comfort and peace of all persons and of all property
within the state, Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Finley, 38 Kan. 550, 16 P. 951 (1888),
and the 14th Amendment does not interfere with the exercise of this power
in a reasonable way for such purposes. Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678,
8 Sup. Ct. 992, 22 L. Ed. 253 (1887).
What constitutes an industry which is sufficiently related to the public interest to warrant its regulation by the state is not limited to any fixed set of
characteristics or facts. "Plainly circumstances may so change in time or so
differ in space as to clothe with such an interest what at other times or in
other places would be a matter of purely private concern." Block v. Hirsch,
supra.
The field of regulation has spread from the more traditional "public utilities" into a variety of industries, for example; bill boards, St. Louis PosterAdvt.
Co. v. City of St. Louis, et al., 246 U.S. 269, 39 Sup. Ct. 274, 63 L. Ed. 599
(1918) ; rents during an emergency in housing facilities, Block v. Hirsch, supra;
insurance rates, German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 34 Sup.
Ct. 612, 56 L. Ed. 1011, L.R.A. 1915 C (1913) ; cotton gins, W. A. Frost v. Corporation Co-nzimission of the State of Oklahoma, 278 U.S. 515, 49 Sup Ct. 235,
73 L. Ed. 983 (1928); hours worked by miners, Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366,
18 Sup. Ct. 383, 42 L. Ed. 780 (1897). The New York court justified the regulation of the price of milk on two grounds. First, that the continuous supply of
wholesome milk to the cities is vital to the public welfare. Cf. People v. Chris
Teuscher, 248 N.Y. 454, 162 N.E. 484 (1928). Second, that the low prices paid
to milk producers resulted in unrest and dissatisfaction which amounted to an
emergency. The continuity of supply or the price at which a commodity is sold
is not important enough to the public welfare to justify regulation. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of IndustrialRelations, 262 U.S. 522, 43 Sup. Ct. 630, 67 L. Ed.

